- Talal Hangari
- May 22
- 4 min read
A Reply to Perry Anderson on Populism
Talal Hangari
22 May, 2025
Professor Anderson’s recent essay (‘Regime Change’, 3 April 2025) in the London Review of Books is admirable; and as an effort to trace the recent history of the politics of the advanced capitalist world, in respect of the practice of neoliberalism and the correspondent rise of populism, it is sure to induce a train of useful reflections in its readers. The perspicuity of Anderson’s analysis notwithstanding, I feel compelled to dissent from his account of populism in two particulars.
First, it seems to me that Anderson errs in his explanation of the greater success of Right Populism as compared with Left Populism. In his view, the “neoliberal order” consists of three pillars: “inequality, oligarchy and factor mobility”; and he accordingly reasons that, although populists of both the Right and the Left can assail the first two pillars with similar warmth, the Left cannot denounce factor mobility—in the shape of immigration—“without moral suicide”, nor has it been able to reach a settled position on the subject. It is remarkable that Anderson omits entirely the fact that the Populist Right everywhere enjoys the support of at least a section of the capitalist class; the Populist Left, on the other hand, is reprobated by the oligarchs without exception. This was established beyond doubt in Britain, where the populist Labour Party led by Jeremy Corbyn was met with the utmost contempt across the mainstream press, while the Blairite wing of Labourism sought to sabotage the populists from within. Nigel Farage, however, is favoured with the donations of millionaires; and he and his comrades advocate their cause in a number of national media outlets designed for the purpose. Once this is understood, another deficiency of Anderson’s explanation becomes evident: for although it may be true that the Populist Right employs criticisms of inequality and oligarchy, which resemble those of the Left, it is nonetheless obvious that the Populist Right intends to do nothing about them, and indeed may aggravate these problems. Oligarchy in the United States has now come out of the shadows; and as Anderson himself remarks, Trump “breathed fire” against the establishment during his first inauguration, only to do “nothing” to match his rhetoric as his presidency underwent an “overnight standardisation”. In view of these facts, it is exceedingly inadequate to say that the Right succeeds because it adds immigrants to its list of targets, while the sincerity of its opposition to private concentrations of wealth and power is at best suspect—or, to speak more candidly, fraudulent. In this light, the more pertinent question is, how is the Populist Right able to command such support, in spite of its clear subservience to sections of capital? I must confess that Anderson’s argument on this point is somewhat surprising from a writer schooled in Marxism; all the more when even Liberal commentators have noticed the close alliance between Right Populists and elements of the business elite[1].
We have next to consider Anderson’s argument respecting the durability of neoliberalism; that is, the failure of Populism of any sort to develop an effectual programme of change. He sets forth the problem thus:
“No populism, right or left, has so far produced a powerful remedy for the ills it denounces. Programmatically, the contemporary opponents of neoliberalism are still for the most part whistling in the dark … That so many arrows remain missing in the quiver of serious opposition to the status quo is not, of course, just the fault of today’s populisms. It reflects the intellectual contraction of the left in its long years of retreat since the 1970s, and the sterility in that time of what were once original strands of thought on the edges of the mainstream. Remedial proposals can be cited, varying from country to country … But so far as any general, interlocking alternative to the status quo is concerned, the cupboard is still bare.”
I agree with Anderson that populism suffers from a poverty of ideas, and that this is, in part, attributable to the present intellectual weakness of the Left. I dissent, however, from Anderson’s implied premise, that a more innovative populism would be able to effectually challenge the present international capitalist system. A challenge of this sort—if it intends to overthrow the capitalist oligarchy—necessarily implies revolution; and revolutions cannot be made by populists. The populist, to be worthy of the name, must advocate a programme which is already favoured by large sections (and often majorities) of the people; and he desires to secure the powers of government as soon as he can on this basis—i.e., on the basis of present opinions. The revolutionary cannot follow this course: the change that he demands is too great. In order to attain his objects, he must work for profound alterations in the opinions of the people—he must win them to revolutionary ideas—and he cannot avoid doing so, if the success of the struggle depends on the activity and dedication of the masses. What is required of the revolutionary, therefore, are patience, and persistent agitation, until society reaches a state of preparedness which permits the revolution to be effected. It follows that the strategies of these political players are utterly irreconcilable, and that a populist can never be expected to make a revolution, though he may well accomplish reforms.
To recapitulate: If we are talking of amending the economic order of the world to “put an end to oligarchies” (Anderson suggests that populists in neoliberal democracies should ponder how to achieve this mighty object), then we are talking of revolution; and if we are talking of revolution, we are talking of an end that populists cannot attain, however many ideas may float in their minds. Hence I find Anderson’s argument to be misleading: it is not that populists lack inventiveness; it is that the very nature of their political strategy, which seeks immediate governance by the advocacy of what are popular ideas today, necessarily excludes the possibility of revolution.
Footnote
See, for example, the Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf, who warns of “pluto-populism” in his book The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism.
Talal Hangari is a socialist writer based in Britain. His website can be found at https://talalhangari.com.
