JD Vance, Absurdity and the Political Subject

Florian Maiwald

7 April 2025

Only the recognition of the absurd that we are all surrounded by can drive political action.

From the outside, JD Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference[i] seemed more than paradoxical. While Vance accused the European states of being characterized by increasing restrictions on freedom of expression, one cannot help but notice that the abuses that Vance criticized the European states for - even if there may indeed be justified points of criticism - are currently coming to light in the US in an even more explicit manner. Looking at the serious restrictions on academic freedom, the arbitrary dismissal of government officials by Musk's DOGE or Trump's blatant (at least announced) plans to annex other countries, one cannot help but notice that Vance's scolding of the European states is more of a kind of - to return to Freud[ii] - cultural projection of the unease that is currently coming to light in the US.

At this point, however, it seems worthwhile to conduct a thought experiment - even if it seems provocative at first: What if Vance knows exactly that the US is characterized by an unmistakable form of democratic regression and yet wants his criticism of the European states to be understood in a completely serious way?

If this thought experiment is carried out consistently, it becomes evident that Vance's speech cannot simply be categorized as a cultural-sociological projection mechanism. Instead, it represents an expression of authentic political subjectivity – albeit one with a politically undesirable orientation. The post-emancipatory subject, as I have discussed elsewhere, is characterized by a process of interpassive delegation of its own emancipatory aspirations (to make a reference to Robert Pfaller's concept).[iii] Applying this post-political (or post-emancipatory) logic to Vance's speech reveals a scenario where Vance, borrowing from Fromm, experiences a literal ‘fear of freedom’, leaving European states to undertake the processes of freedom and democratization on behalf of the United States.

But even this is of course – and I am fully aware of this – a thoroughly idle and simplistic interpretation of the currently prevailing socio-political situation.

Rather, Vance appears to embody a form of authentic political subjectivity – one that is inherently emancipatory (even though in Vance’s case in a negative way). This structure of subjectivity is characterized by what can be described as the ethical imperative of the ‘nevertheless’ (Dennoch). This ‘nevertheless’ signifies an acknowledgment of the contingency of social and political conditions. Or, as Thomas Nagel aptly expressed in his essay on absurdity, it reflects the uniquely human capacity to step back, recognize the absurdity of our actions, and yet persist in them.

The most compelling aspect of Nagel's essay lies in its implications, which extend far beyond merely identifying an epistemic peculiarity of the human condition. The central argument presented here suggests that Nagel (even if he did not explicitly intend to) highlights a fundamental characteristic – or essential prerequisite – of political subjectivity: to accept the contradiction between ideal and reality. The political subject is defined by its capacity for self-reflexivity – the ability to step back, recognize the relativity of its actions and the contingency of existence, and yet continue to act with purpose.

For Nagel, the recognition of life's absurdity does not lead to a paralyzing nihilism. On the contrary, it serves as a source of empowerment for the subject, enabling action rather than stifling it. At this point, it is worth quoting Nagel directly, as he emphasizes that absurdity emerges from a universal form of discrepancy – a tension that is constitutive of human existence itself:

If there is a philosophical sense of absurdity, however, it must arise from the perception of something universal-some respect in which pretension and reality inevitably clash for us all. This condition is supplied [...] by the collision between the seriousness with which we take our lives and the perpetual possibility of regarding everything about which we are serious as arbitrary, or open to doubt.[iv]

According to Nagel, the absurdity of human existence arises from an internal collision between our subjective aspirations and the objective contingency of reality. This differs fundamentally from Albert Camus' perspective, which locates absurdity in the external clash between human ideals and a world devoid of inherent meaning. Camus suggests that absurdity stems from the failure of the world to meet our demands for meaning, implying that a different world might fulfill these ideals. In contrast, Nagel argues that absurdity is a mental operation within the subject itself – a result of our ability to adopt a detached, universal perspective on our own lives.

Nagel's conception of absurdity highlights the irreconcilable tension between two perspectives: the subjective seriousnesswith which we approach our lives and the objective realization that these pursuits are arbitrary or open to doubt. This dual awareness constitutes a universal human condition, independent of external circumstances. For Nagel, absurdity is not repugnant but rather a profound insight into our existence. It is precisely this recognition of contingency and relativity that carries emancipatory implications, enabling self-reflexivity and empowering political subjectivity. By embracing this tension without succumbing to nihilism, Nagel concept of absurdity can be positioned as a catalyst for political action rather than paralysis.[v]

The emancipatory subject in the context of Marxist theory is also characterized by a tension between ideal and reality – with the important implication that reality can be set as absolute and presupposes an external, completely detached epistemic standpoint that is able to recognize that neither feudalism nor in capitalism are able to completely realize the principles of freedom and equality. In short: that the universal ideals (freedom and equality) remain merely an abstraction and stand in clear discrepancy to the prevailing social and material conditions.[vi]

Such a tension between ideal and reality is also evident in Nagel's theoretical framework. However, in his view, this reality is not absolute but contingent, arising entirely from the mental operations of the subject.:

We step back to find that the whole system of justification and criticism, which controls our choices and supports our claims to rationality, rests on responses and habits that we never question, that we should not know how to defend without circularity, and to which we shall continue to adhere even after they are called into question. The things we do or want without reasons, and without requiring reasons-the things that define what is a reason for us and what is not-are the starting points of our skepticism. We see ourselves from outside, and all the contingency and specificity of our aims and pursuits become clear. Yet when we take this view and recognize what we do as arbitrary, it does not disengage us from life, and there lies our absurdity: not in the fact that such an external view can be taken of us, but in the fact that we ourselves can take it, without ceasing to be the persons whose ultimate concerns are so coolly regarded.[vii]

The reality against which political ideals must be measured is not the objective telos of a better society. Instead, the political subject is defined by an ethos of ‘nevertheless’ – the capacity to persist in pursuing its objectives despite recognizing their contingency and relativity. This ethos enables the subject to actively engage in shaping a better world through political action, even in the face of contradictions.

JD Vance exemplifies this paradoxical dynamic. In his recent speech, Vance might even be aware of the absurdity of demanding European states uphold values that are under attack from his own political camp in the United States. Yet, he nevertheless advocates for these values. This act underscores the importance for progressive movements worldwide to reclaim political subjectivity and not allow politically regressive figures like Vance, with significant political influence, to dominate this space.

For the progressive camp, rediscovering political subjectivity involves embracing self-reflexivity and maintaining commitment to ideals while actively engaging in transformative political action. This approach ensures that the ethos of ‘nevertheless’ serves as a force for meaningful change rather than being co-opted by illiberal agendas.

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Florian Maiwald has a PhD in Philosophy at the University of Bonn. His new book Regressive Illusions, is out soon. His Everyday Analysis pamphlet. The Regressive Illusion of Woke Capitalism is available here.

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[i]"Vance, J.D. (2025) "The U.S. in the World." Speech, Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 14, 2025. https://securityconference.org/mediathek/asset/the-speech-of-jd-vance-20250214-1817/."

[ii] Freud, S. (1940) Collected Works. Ninth volume. Totem and Taboo. London: Imago Publishing Co, p. 79-80, Ltd.

[iii] Maiwald, Florian. (2023). "Emancipation and the Political Superego: Interpassivity Reconsidered." Sublation Magazine, August 14, 2023. https://www.sublationmag.com/post/emancipation-and-the-political-superego-interpassivity-reconsidered.

[iv] Nagel, T. (1971). "The Absurd." The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 20: 718. https://philosophy.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/The%20Absurd%20-%20Thomas%20Nagel.pdf.

[v] Cf. Nagel, 1971, 721-722.

[vi] Cf. Rooksby Ed (2012). “The Relationship Between Liberalism and Socialism.” Science & Society 76, no. 4 : 509. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41714354.

[vii] Cf. Nagel, 1971, 720.